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PREEMPTION OF FEDERAL COMMON LAWCITY OF MILWAUKEE v. ILLINOIS
Prior to 1938, federal courts had acquired significant power through the
application of what was generally known as federal common law. Federal
common law, as it then existed, consisted of a collective body of decisional
law that was exclusive of state court decisions. The United States Supreme
Court, in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,' effectively abolished the general principles of federal common law when it declared that federal courts derived
their power from the common law authority of the states. The Court,
however, did not completely eradicate the application of federal common
law. In Erie's companion case, Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry
Creek Ditch Co., 2 the Court ruled that under the unique circumstances involving the apportionment of interstate waters, the governing principle
would be federal common law. 3 In the years following Hinderlider, the
federal court system has witnessed the emergence of a "specialized" federal

common law4 in areas such as foreign relations,' maritime disputes,' and
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie declared that federal courts do not possess an independent
"transcendental body of law" from which to draw their legal conclusions. "Except in matters
governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case
is the law of the State." Id. at 78.
2. 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
3. Id. at 110. The dispute in Hinderlider involved the apportionment of the La Plata
River. The ditch company argued that the apportionment compact reached between Colorado
and New Mexico violated its right to divert and use the waters of the river. In formulating
equitable relief, the Supreme Court stated that "whether the water of an interstate stream must
be apportioned between the two States is a question of 'federal common law' upon which
neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive." Id.
4. One commentator remarked that "[s]pecialized federal common law for such controversies [federal taxation, patent and bankruptcy cases] is consistent with the statement of
the majority in the Tompkins case that 'there is no federal general common law.' " Comment,
The Demise of Swift v. Tyson, 47 YALE L.J. 1336, 1350 (1938) (emphasis added). See Friendly,
In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 383, 405 (1964).
Several authors have categorized those areas of law that federal common law has penetrated.
See M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER
79-107 (1980) [hereinafter cited as REDISH] (federal proprietary interests, foreign relations,
maritime law and control of interstate pollution); Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal
Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hill]
(controversies involving states, admiralty cases, proprietary interests of the United States, and
international law); Note, Exceptions to Erie v. Tompkins: The Survival of Federal Common
Law, 59 HARV. L. REV. 966 (1946) (suits by the United States, suits under a federal statute,
and diversity cases involving a federal statute).
5. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (federal common
law in relation to Act of State doctrine). For a discussion of federal common law in foreign
relations, see Hill, supra note 4, at 1042-68.
6. Article 11I, § 2 of the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part that "[tIhe
judicial Power shall extend . . . to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2. Thus, Article III provides a basis for extending federal common law to
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the proprietary rights of the federal government.' The underlying rationale
for employing federal common law in these specialized areas has been the
protection of strong federal interests and the compelling need for a uniform
national policy.'
This same rationale prompted the Supreme Court, in Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee9 (Milwaukee I), to expand the application of federal common

maritime cases. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970) (wrongful death
action recoverable under federal maritime law). But see, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham,
436 U.S. 618 (1978) (survivors of deceased seamen were not allowed to recover additional
damages for "loss to society" under federal maritime law because this remedy was not set
forth in The Death on the High Seas Act). For further analysis of federal common law as applied in maritime cases see REDISH, supra note 4, at 97-105; P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D.
SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 817-21 (2d ed. 1973).
7. The leading case on proprietary rights of the federal government, Clearfield Trust Co.
v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), involved the right of the government to control the issuance of commercial paper. The Clearfield Court held that the government had a federal
common law right to recover funds on a forged check guaranteed by Clearfield Trust. The
Court snated:
In our choice of the applicable federal rule we have occasionally selected state
law. . . . But reasons which may make state law at times the appropriate federal
rule are singularly inappropriate here. The issuance of commercial paper by the
United States is on a vast scale and transactions . . . commonly occur in several
states. The application of state law . . . would subject the rights and duties of the
United States to exceptional uncertainty. It would lead to great diversity in results
by making identical transactions subject to the vagaries of the laws of several
states. The desirability of a uniform rule is plain.
Id. at 367. Similarly, in National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454, 456
(1945), forged checks drawn on the United States Treasury were recoverable under federal
common law. Cf. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 33 (1956).
8. Justice Jackson, in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S.
447 (1942), expressed the substantive basis of federal common law:
Federal law is no juridical chameleon, changing complexion to match that of each
state. . . . It is found in the federal Constitution, statutes, or common law. Federal
common law implements the federal Constitution and statutes, and is conditioned
by them. Within these limits, federal courts are free to apply the traditional
common-law technique of decision and to draw upon all the sources of the common law ...
Id. at 471-72 (Jackson, J., concurring).
In United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947), the Supreme Court ruled that the
rights of the government to recover the costs of hospitalization stemming from the injury of an
army soldier by defendant's negligent truck driver was governed by federal, not state, law. The
Standard Oil Court stressed uniformity of national policy as key in its decision to govern this
action by federal law.
Not only is the government-soldier relation distinctively and exclusively a creation
of federal law, but we know of no good reason why the Government's right to be
indemnified in these circumstances . . . should vary in accordance with the different rulings of the several states, simply because the soldier marches . . . across
state lines.
Id. at 310.
9. 406 U.S. 91 (1972). Because of the federal interests involved in maintaining clean water
and the lack of an adequate remedy under existing statutes, the Court recognized the ap-

1981]

CITY OF MIL WA UKEE

law to disputes involving pollution of interstate and navigable waterways.
In the same year Milwaukee I was decided, however, Congress passed the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (1972 Amendments),'°-a comprehensive scheme of legislation aimed at controlling and
eventually eliminating pollution discharges into navigable waterways.
In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois" (Milwaukee II), the Supreme Court ruled
that federal common law was preempted by the congressional enactment of
the 1972 Amendments.' 2 The comprehensive remedies available under the
1972 Amendments and the lack of express preservation of federal common
law convinced the Court that Congress intended to strip away the federal
courts' common law powers. The Milwaukee II Court held that federal
courts were prohibited from imposing stricter water pollution standards
than those prescribed by Congress.' 3 As a result, Milwaukee II has effectively precluded federal courts from establishing any judicial standards to
combat the pollution of interstate and navigable waterways.
There are several objections to Milwaukee I1s restriction on the ability of
federal courts to apply federal common law. An examination of the
language of the 1972 Amendments and its corresponding congressional
records reveals that there is relatively little support for the Court's conclusion that Congress intended to preempt federal common law. The inability
of federal courts to apply common law remedies in the area of federal control of water pollution will undermine the effectiveness of judicial enforcement of the laws. On a broader scale, the Milwaukee II decision could have
a major impact on the ability of federal courts to fashion federal common
law in other environmental areas where Congress has provided a statutory
scheme of regulation. Finally, the abrogation of federal common law
evidenced by Milwaukee II could shift judicial power from federal to state
courts. This may result in the erosion of the uniform national approach
Congress strived for in solving the nation's water pollution problems.
BACKGROUND

The United States Supreme Court has recognized a state's inherent right
and responsibility to protect its citizens from harmful pollution that crosses

propriateness of applying federal common law to combat water pollution. See notes 21-26 and
accompanying text infra. For a further discussion of the use of federal common law in environmental litigation, see Leybold, Federal Common Law: Judicially Established Effluent
Standards as a Remedy in Federal Nuisance Actions, 7 ENVTL. AFF. 293 (1978); Note, Federal
Common Law and Interstate Pollution, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1439, 1451-56 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Interstate Pollution].
10. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976) (amending Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1151-1175 (1970)) [hereinafter cited as 1972 Amendments]. See notes 34-43 and accompanying text infra.
11. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
12. Id. at 314-15.
13. Id.
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into its boundaries." When noxious gases produced by a Tennessee corporation drifted over into Georgia, the Court found ample grounds to grant
an injunction against the corporation.'" In 1971, a federal court followed
the Supreme Court's approach and recognized Texas' right to enjoin New
Mexico citizens from spraying pesticides which ultimately polluted its water
supply.' 6 Until 1972, however, the Supreme Court failed to expressly define
a federal common law remedy in pollution cases.
Federal Common Law in Interstate
Water Pollution Disputes
The silence was broken when the Supreme Court decided Milwaukee L."7
In that case, Illinois sought original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court to
prevent Milwaukee from creating a health hazard through its daily
discharge of approximately 200 million gallons of sewage into Lake
Michigan.' 8 Although the Court declined to exercise original jurisdiction,' 9
it unanimously extended federal common law authority to resolve water
pollution disputes involving interstate and navigable waters.2 0
14. See, e.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901). Missouri was one of the first cases
in which the Supreme Court recognized a state's duty to protect its citizens from a foreign
state's pollution. The State of Missouri had complained that the new sanitary canal built by Illinois to divert all of its sewage away from Chicago posed a severe health threat to its citizens.
In holding that Missouri was a proper party to file suit, the Court remarked: "It is true that
no question of boundary is involved, nor of direct property rights belonging to the complainant State. But ... if the health and comfort of the inhabitants of a State are threatened, the
State is the proper party to represent and defend them." Id. at 241.
15. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907). The gases were causing the
total destruction of Georgia's forests and cropland over a five county region. The Court
described the inherent right of one state to have its neighboring state's pollution abated as "a
fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign that the air over its territory should not
be polluted.
... Id. at 238.
16. Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971). Pankey was the first pollution case
that expressly applied a federal common law remedy. The Pankey court relied on Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907), as support for its application of federal common
law. For an analysis of the Pankey decision see Interstate Pollution, supra note 9, at 1440-51.
17. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
18. Id. at 93. Illinois alleged that Milwaukee's daily discharge into Lake Michigan severely
endangered the health and safety of its citizens. Id.
19. Id. at 93-98. The Milwaukee I Court held that it had original, but not exclusive,
jurisdiction over the matter. The City of Milwaukee, the Court ruled, was merely a political
subdivision and therefore not a "State" within the purview of 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1976). Section 1251(a) provided that "lt]he Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
of: (1) All controversies between two or more States." Id. For articles focusing on the jurisdictional aspects of Milwaukee I, see Comment, Public Nuisance Suits Concerning Interstate
Water Pollution-Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 49 DEN. L.J. 609 (1973); Note, Cause of Action Under Federal Common Law for Pollution of Interstate Waters, Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 77 DIcK. L. REV. 451 (1973); Note, Federal Common Law in Interstate Water
Pollution Disputes, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 141.

20. 406 U.S. at 101-08. Milwaukee I provided environmentalists with a more effective
means to combat pollution problems. Water .pollution legislation, prior to the 1972 Amendments, was regarded as ineffective and generally lacking strong enforcement mechanisms to
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The Milwaukee I Court's justification for applying federal common law
was founded upon congressional demonstration of a strong national interest

in preserving the nation's waterways. 2' The Court observed that federal
agencies were subject to the command of the National Environmental

Policy Act of 196922 which required each agency to promulgate environmentally sound procedures in all their programs. More recently, the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA)23 clearly mandated that it was
federal, not state, law that ultimately determined water quality standards

for each state. 2" The Court's conclusion that there was a strong federal interest in the purity of interstate waters was well supported by prior congres-

sional activity in the area of environmental legislation."5 Writing for the
Milwaukee I Court, Justice Douglas stated that "where there is an over-

riding federal interest in the need for a uniform rule of decision or where
the controversy touches basic interests of federalism, we have fashioned
federal common law." 6 Federal common law, as pronounced in Milwaukee
I, ostensibly became the vehicle for providing states with an effective
remedy in interstate water pollution disputes.
This broad decision granting federal common law remedies was not,
however, without its limitations. The Milwaukee I Court declared that
federal common law would exist so long as Congress did not preempt it
with new legislation. In a seemingly innocuous statement, Justice Douglas

asserted: "It may happen that new federal laws and new federal regulations
may in time pre-empt the field of federal common law nuisance."" Thus,

the ability of federal courts to fashion federal common law remedies
ultimately

hinged on whether Congress passed legislation that would

preempt it. The Milwaukee I Court, however, failed to characterize what
constituted preemptive legislation.
adequately carry out its primary objectives. See notes 29-32 and accompanying text infra.
21. 406 U.S. at 101-03.
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976). Congress was committed to cleaning up the nation's
pollution and declared that "it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to
use all practicable means . . .to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs
and resources to . . . assure for all Americans safe [and] healthful . . .surroundings." Id. §
4331(b), (b)(l).
23. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1175 (1970) (amended 1972) [Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(pre-1972 Amendments) hereinafter cited as FWPCA].
24. If a state either delayed implementation of pollution standards or adopted standards
that were inconsistent with the policy objectives of the FWPCA, standards would be imposed
by the federal goverment. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151 (l)(a)(b), (10)(c)(1)-(3) (1970) (amended 1972).
25. The Milwaukee I Court noted other attempts by Congress to preserve the nation's environmental resources such as the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 661-668(ee) (1970), the Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956, 16 U.S.C. §§ 742(a)-754 (1970), and
the Rivers and Harbors Act of March 3, 1899, 30 Stat. 1121 (1899). A complete directory of
water pollution legislation prior to 1972 can be found in HOUSE COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, 91ST
CONG., 2D SESS., LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES RELATING TO WATER POLLUTION CONTROL AND

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (Comm. Print 1970).
26. 406 U.S. at 105 n.6. See note 8 supra.
27. 406 U.S. at 107.
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The Federal Water Pollution Control Act

Amendments of 1972
The Milwaukee I Court did not view the FWPCA as a bar to the applica-

tion of federal common law. Although the Court failed to give a thorough
explanation for its conclusion that the FWPCA was not a barrier, this decision was probably based 8 on the severe inadequacies that existed in the

FWPCA's enforcement mechanisms. 29 The major criticisms of the FWPCA
were that its enforcement procedures were complex and time-consuming," °
and that the water quality method of measuring pollution was too cumber-

some and inaccurate." Given such an inefficiency-plagued enforcement program, Congress had ample justification for concluding that "the national
effort to abate and control water pollution ha[d] been inadequate in every
vital aspect .. ."32

In response to these deficiencies, Congress, only five months after the
28. It is surmised that when legislative protections in an area of national concern, such as
interstate pollution are inadequate, the judiciary feels more compelled to intervene. See notes
14-16 and accompanying text supra.
29. The Milwaukee I Court summarily commented that the FWPCA used "long-drawnout" procedures. 406 U.S. at 107. See notes 30-32 and accompanying text infra.
30. For instance, the FWPCA required that a governor or a state water pollution control
agency initiate the procedure of abating water pollution by requesting the Secretary of the Interior to call a conference of all parties involved. No timetables were established for this procedure. 33 U.S.C. § 1160(d)(l) (1970) (amended 1972). If the Secretary did not believe that
proper measures were being taken, he would "recommend" that the state water pollution control agency take legal action. The Secretary was then required to wait at least 180 days to see if
the affected state was seeking adequate remedies. Id. § 1160(e). When these procedures failed,
a hearing was held, and if the board found evidence indicating that pollution was affecting the
health and safety of citizens, the Secretary prepared a report for distribution to all interested
parties. Id. § 1160(f)(1). Finally, if these efforts did not elicit a response, only then was the Attorney General authorized to file suit. Id. § 1160(g)(l). Given the bureaucracy involved, it is
not surprising that "[olnly 53 enforcement conferences were called between 1956 and 1971; of
these, four reached the hearing phase and only one suit finally went to court." H. LIEBER,
FEDERALISM AND CLEAN WATERS 20 (1975) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as LIEBER].
31. The FWPCA used a "water quality" method of determining pollution levels. Under
this formula, pollution was measured as a function of the amount of chemicals, sewage, etc.,
which a given body of water could tolerate, instead of the actual amount of pollution that was
being discharged. 33 U.S.C. § 1160(c)(3), (c)(5) (1970) (amended 1972). The inappropriateness
of this methodology is readily apparent given that each body of water possesses different
"pollution-holding" capabilities. The Supreme Court has criticized the water quality method
because it focuses on tolerable effects rather than preventable causes of water pollution. See
Environmental Protection Agency v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426
U.S. 200 (1976). In the Court's view "[tihe problems stemmed from the character of the standards themselves, which focused on the tolerable effects rather than the preventable -causes of
the water pollution.
...
Id. at 202. See also LIEBER, supra note 30, at 21-23.
32. S.REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971), reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON PUB.
WORKS, 93RD CONG., IST SESS., 2 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL

1972 1425 (Comm. Print 1973) [reprinted material hereinafter cited as
The Senate committee found that "[mIany of the Nation's navigable
waters [were] severely polluted, and major waterways near the industrial and urban areas
[were] unfit for most purposes." 2 LEG. HIST. OF 1972, supra, at 1425.
ACT AMENDMENTS OF
LEG. HIST. OF 1972].
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Milwaukee I decision, enacted the 1972 Amendments33 to strengthen the
FWPCA's enforcement procedures. Congress established a tough goal-the
elimination of all pollution discharges by 1985.1' In order to meet this objective, Congress focused on streamlining the enforcement procedures.
First, the 1972 Amendments replaced the vague water quality method of
measuring pollution with affirmative effluent discharge standards.3" Second,
the new legislation created the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) to enforce compliance with effluent limitations.3 6 Under
NPDES, effluent permits are granted by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA)3 7 or an EPA-sanctioned state agency to dischargers of
pollutants. The discharge permits specify exact effluent limitations with
which dischargers are required to comply, 9 and any deviation is considered
unlawful.'" Unlike the FWPCA," the 1972 Amendments set specific
deadlines for meeting effluent standards. 2 The 1972 Amendments also en33. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
34. The objectives of the 1972 Amendments were, in pertinent part:
(a) [T]o restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters. In order to achieve this objective it is hereby declared that ...
(1) it is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable
waters be eliminated by 1985;
(2) it is the national goal that wherever attainable, an interim goal of water
quality which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and
wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the water be achieved by July 1,
1983....

33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1976).
35. Effluent discharge standards are measured at the "point source" or the actual place
from which the polluter allows his discharges to flow. The 1972 Amendments defined point
source as "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any
pipe, ditch [or] channel ... from which pollutants are or may be discharged." Id. § 1362(14).
In addition, "effluent limitation" is defined as "any restriction established by a State or Administrator on quantities ...

and concentrations of chemical[s] . . .which are discharged from

...
Id. § 1362(11).
point sources into navigable waters.
36. Id. § 1342. In addition to establishing a permit granting system, the NPDES section expressly supplanted any remedies previously existing under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.
Id. § 1342(a)(5).
37. Id. §§ 1251(d), 1342(a)(1).
38. Id. § 1342(a)(5).
39. Id. § 1342(a)(2).
40. Id. § 1311 (a). The Administrator could seek civil as well as criminal penalties for a permit
violation. Initially, the Administrator is required to give thirty days notification to the polluting state, and if no action has been taken to eliminate the pollution, the Administrator has the
authority to commence a civil suit. Id. § 1319(a)(1), (b). If the frequency of violations persists,
the Administrator can seek a one to two year prison sentence for polluters. Id. § 1319(c)(l)-(2).
41. See note 30 supra.
42. Effluent or discharge limitation standards for private industry point sources were required to meet the "best practicable control technology" by July 1, 1977. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(b)(l)(A) (1976) (emphasis added). The second deadline required that by July 1, 1983 the
"best available technology" be used to determine effluent standards. Id. § 131 l(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Publicly owned water treatment plants were held to a less strict schedule requiring only that the "best practicable waste treatment technology" be met by July 1, 1983. Id.
§§ 1281(g)(2)(A), 1311(b)(2)(B). Nowhere in the statute are the terms "best practicable" or
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courage citizen suits and expressly provide that any person adversely affected by the pollution could initiate a civil action to force compliance. 3
Despite the comprehensiveness of the 1972 legislation, Congress amended
it further by passing the Clean Water Act of 1977."" In an effort to finetune the 1972 Amendments, Congress revised, among other provisions, 5 the
sections pertaining to the issuance of permits under NPDES, 6 extensions of
compliance dates,"7 and allocations of new funds to assess current
municipal problems in wastewater treatment."8
In determining whether the 1972 Amendments were intended to have a
preemptive effect on federal common law, it is important to note that Congress, in both the 1972 Amendments and the Clean Water Act of 1977,
failed to expressly abolish federal common law. Nowhere did Congress indicate that either piece of legislation was to take precedence over federal

common law."9
Supreme Court decisions after Milwaukee I were not dispositive on the
preemptory effect of the 1972 Amendments on federal common law. In-

"best available" defined and the Administrator is given the discretion to identify their-meanings. Id. § 1314(c)-(e).
43. Section 505 of the 1972 Amendments, which was modeled after the Clean Air Act of
1970, provides in pertinent part that "any citizen may commence a civil action on his own
behalf-(1) against any person .. .who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation . . . or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or State with respect to such
a standard or limitation .. " 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), (a)(1) (1976). Prior to the 1972 Amendments, the FWPCA did not provide any means by which a private citizen could bring suit.
Under the new legislation, the inclusion of citizen suits significantly expanded the number of
remedies available. See 2 LEG. HIST. OF 1972, supra note 32, at 1497.
44. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. 1 1977) (amending Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976)).
45. In addition to those discussed in the text, other provisions revised by the Clean Water
Act of 1977 include recoupment of costs incurred by the government from oil spills, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1321 (Supp. I 1977), see SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUB. WORKS, 95TH CONG.,
1ST SESS., THE CLEAN WATER ACT SHOWING CHANGES MADE BY THE 1977 AMENDMENTS 73-85
(Comm. Print 1977), reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUB. WORKS, 95TH
CONG., 2D SESS.,

3A

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT OF

1977 127-39 (Comm.

Print 1978) [reprintedmaterial hereinafter cited as LEG. HIST. OF 19771, and special legislation
pertaining to toxic pollutants, 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (Supp. I 1977). See 3 LEG. HIST. OF 1977,
supra, at 118-122.
46. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(8), (d)(2), (d)(4), (h), (1)
(Supp. 1 1977). See 3 LEG. HIST. OF 1977,
supra note 45, at 151-55.
47. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (Supp. 1 1977). See 3 LEG. HIST. OF 1977, supra note 45, at 99-105.
48. 33 U.S.C. § 1375(c) (Supp. 1 1977). See 3 LEG. HIST. OF 1977, supra note 45, at 178.
The Clean Water Act of 1977 setforth special funds for a study to be conducted on combined
sewer overflows because it was feared that major cities lacked adequate facilities to properly
treat sewage wastes. See H.R. REP. No. 830, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 108 (1977), reprinted in 3
LEG. HIST. OF 1977, supra note 45, at 292. See also 3 LEG. HIST. OF 1977, supra note 45, at
364-65.
49. Although neither the 1972 nor the 1977 amendments referred to federal common law,
legislative history does support the interpretation that common law should be invoked only
when damages can be proven and statutory remedies are inadequate to abate the nuisance. See
notes 112-16 and accompanying text infra.
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stead, most of the Court's decisions focused on the basic provisions of the
1972 Amendments.5 The Supreme Court did, however, provide insight into
the judicial climate at the time of Milwaukee H when it decided a number
of cases in an area closely related to the application of federal common
law-implied private rights of action under statutory schemes.
50. See, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency v. California ex rel. State Water Resources
Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200 (1976) (construing § 313-federal installations discharging pollutant
not required to obtain permit); Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975) (§§ 205 and 207
do not permit Administrator to allot states less than the authorized federal financial
assistance).
Lower federal courts have generally held that federal common law is not displaced by the
1972 Amendments, but rather it supplements available statutory remedies. In Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979), the Sevenih Circuit concluded that the 1972 Amendments did not preempt application of federal common law. On the contrary, the court found
that Congress expressly sought to preserve this remedy in § 505(e)-the "savings clause". Id.
at 164. See notes 115 & 119 infra. The district court had reached the identical conclusion in an
earlier stage of the case when it ruled against a motion made by Milwaukee to dismiss the action. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 366 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ill. 1973). The district court found
no congressional intent to make the 1972 Amendments the exclusive source of remedies. Its
purpose, the court concluded, was to "supplement" and "amplify" available remedies. Id. at
301. See note 75 infra.
Two recent cases decided by the Seventh Circuit reinforce the notion that the 1972 Amendments supplement, rather than preempt federal common law. In Illinois v. Outboard Marine
Corp., 619 F.2d 623, 626-28 (7th Cir. 1980), a federal common law remedy was granted to
alleviate intrastate pollution which eventually would have caused the pollution of interstate
waters. Similarly, in City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980), the plaintiff's failure to provide statutory notice
was no bar from obtaining federal common law relief under the "savings clause".
For other decisions upholding the non-preemptive effect of the 1972 Amendments, see
National Sea Clammers Ass'n. v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1980) (statutory
and federal common law relief granted to fishermen in order to compel local, state, and
federal environmental authorities to comply with statutory duties), rev'd sub noma. Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); Township of
Long Beach v. City of New York, 445 F. Supp. 1203, 1214-16 (D.N.J. 1978) (statutory relief
was not exclusive but merely co-existent with a federal common law remedy); United States v.
Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 110 (D.Vt. 1973), aff'd mem., 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1973) (absent any indication from Congress to limit the
available remedies, equitable relief arising from federal common law is not precluded by the
1972 Amendments); United States ex rel. Scott v. United States Steel Corp., 356 F. Supp. 556
(N.D. I11.1973) (defendant's argument that the 1972 Amendments had "completely occupied"
the area of water pollution struck down because there was no evidence of congressional intent
to supplant federal common law). See also Committee for Consideration of Jones Falls Sewage
Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006, 1010-16 (4th Cir. 1976) (Butzner, J., dissenting) (federal common
law not supplanted by the 1972 Amendments because Congress intended to preserve this
remedy).
Only one court has prohibited the application of federal common law. See Committee for
Consideration of Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006, 1009 (4th Cir. 1976) (compliance with the NPDES permit system precludes any application of federal common law since
"it would be an anomaly to hold that there was a body of federal common law which proscribes conduct which the 1972 Act of Congress legitimates"). See also Massachusetts v.
United States Veterans Admin., 541 F.2d 119 (1st Cir. 1976) (court implied, but did not
ultimately rule, that the 1972 Amendments could have a preemptory effect).
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Post Milwaukee I Cases Involving Implied
Private Rights of Action
The adjudication of cases involving implied private rights of action raises
issues and considerations similar to those involved in cases of federal common law. In implying a private right of action from a regulatory statute, a
court grants a remedy for the plaintiff without explicit congressional
authorization. A court must find that Congress intended the benefits of a
particular statute to include a right for a private individual to bring a cause
of action. By inferring such a right, a court fills in the "gaps" left by Congress, and in effect, performs a common law function. Like the plaintiff
who seeks an implied right of action, the plaintiff who requests a federal
common law remedy is asking the court to imply a cause of action based
upon the unexpressed intentions of Congress.' The Milwaukee I Court, for
example, implied a federal common law remedy based upon congressional
attempts to abate pollution through federal legislation. 2 The touchstone in
either instance is the court's statutory construction and analysis of congressional intent." In recent years, the Supreme Court, on a number of occasions, has confronted the issue of implied private rights of action under
statutory schemes. With only one exception,"' the Court has rejected every
attempt to establish such a right.
In 1975, the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash," formulated a four-part test
to determine when a private right of action was to be implied from a
statute. Under the Cort test, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the statute was
enacted for the benefit of a class of persons to which he belongs;' 6 (2) it
was the intent of Congress to create the remedy;' 7 (3) the remedy was con51. The Petitioners in Milwaukee II recognized the similarity of issues raised in finding an
implied private right of action and the application of federal common law. "Whether the
authority of the 'private litigant' to pursue the second action is implied from the provisions of
FWPCA [the 1972 Amendments] or is based upon federal common law, the problem is the
same." Brief for Petitioners in Reply to Briefs Amici Curiae of the United States, State of
New York and New England Legal Foundation at 9, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S.
304 (1981).
52. See notes 21-26 and accompanying text supra.
53. See notes 57 & 64 infra.
54. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). See also note 61 and ac-

companying text infra.
55. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
56. Id. at 78. This first requirement was based upon dictum set forth in Texas & Pacific
Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916). The Court in Rigsby stated:
A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it results
in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,
the right to recover the damages from the party in default is implied, according to
[the] doctrine of . . . common law.

Id. at 39. The single factor test enunciated by the Rigsby Court was used by the federal courts
until Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).

57. 422 U.S. at 78. Legislative intent has been recognized as the principle factor in implying a private right of action. Justice Rehnquist recently summed up the essence of the Cort formula:
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sistent with the objectives of the statute;58 and (4) the cause of action was

brought most appropriately in federal court. 9 Based upon these four factors, the Cort majority refused to grant a corporate stockholder an implied
private right of action against the company's directors for making campaign
contributions even though there was a criminal statute prohibiting such contributions.6"
Although the Supreme Court in Cannon v. University of Chicago" found
that a medical school applicant who alleged discrimination had an implied
private right of action under Title IX, that was the last case to imply such a

right. In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, the Court denied an implied
private right of action to a securities insurance firm under the Securities Exchange Act.63 The Court took a modified approach to the Cort four-part
test and focused its inquiry on whether there was congressional intent to
confer a private right of action. The Touche Ross Court found nothing in
the Securities Exchange Act65 or in the legislative history that suggested that

[Tlhe so-called Cort factors are merely guides in the central task of ascertaining
legislative intent ...

that they are not of equal weight ...

and that in deciding an

implied-right-of-action case courts need not mechanically trudge through all four
of the factors when the dispositive question of legislative intent has been resolved.
California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 302 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
58. 422 U.S. at 78.
59. Id.

60. Id. at 78-85.
61. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). In finding an implied private right of action, the Cannon Court
analogized the private action provisions of Title IX to those specified in Title VII and concluded
that it was the intent of Congress to confer such a right. Id. at 689-709. For a thorough discussion of Cannon, see Note, Title IX: No Longer An Empty Promise-Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 29 DEPAUL L. REV. 263 (1979).
62. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
63. The petitioner, an accounting firm, allegedly reported inaccurate financial statements of
a securities brokerage firm whom the respondent had insured. The brokerage firm became insolvent and the respondent brought an implied action to recoup its losses. Id. at 563-66.
64. Id. at 568. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, referred to the Cort factors and
stated:
It is true that in Cort v. Ash, the Court set forth four factors that it considered
"relevant" in determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one. But the Court did not decide that each of these factors is
entitled to equal weight. The central inquiry remains whether Congress intended to
create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action. Indeed, the
first three factors discussed in Cort-the language and focus of the statute, its
legislative history, and its purpose ... are ones traditionally relied upon in determining legislative intent.
Id. at 575-76 (citation omitted). See note 57 supra.
65. 442 U.S. at 570. The Touche Ross Court held that the Securities Exchange Act did not
provide for recoupment of losses incurred as a result of incomplete financial statements. In
reaching this conclusion, the Touche Ross Court reasoned that the Securities Exchange Act did
not benefit any specific class of persons because the statute's purpose was to "forestall insolvency" by requiring complete access to financial records, and therefore, the statute did not
regard any conduct as unlawful. Id. at 570-71.
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Congress intended to confer a private right of action. 6 Thus, the Court
refused to allow the insurance company to maintain an action.67 Following
Touche Ross, the Supreme Court denied requests for an implied private
right of action under at least four other statutes. 68 Based on Touche Ross
and subsequent cases, it appears that absent any indicia of congressional intent, the Supreme Court is reluctant to fill in the "gaps" and find an implied private right of action. This reluctance has been translated into a
refusal by the Supreme Court to expand the federal common law doctrine.
The similarity between federal common law and implied private rights of
action was recently recognized by the Court in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Transport Workers Union.69 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, refused
to grant the airline an implied private right of action under either the Equal
Pay Act or Title VII. 7 ° The Court also denied a request for a federal common law remedy of contribution. 7 ' The Northwest Airlines Court reasoned

that once Congress enters a field and regulates it through comprehensive
legislation, there is no longer a need for federal courts to imply any addi-

66. Id. at 571.
67. Id. The Touche Ross decision exposes the inconsistency of applying the four-part Cort
test to older statutes. Prior to Cort, implied private rights of action were governed by the simple Rigsby rule which provided that rights flowed to an injured individual if the statute was
enacted for the benefit of a class of persons to which that person belonged. See note 56 supra.
It is unlikely that earlier Congresses expressed every remedy in detail because, under the Rigsby
rule, remedies were implied. Thus, under the four-part Cort test, demonstrating the congressional intent behind statutes enacted prior to the Cort decision would be nearly impossible.
Accordingly, there will undoubtedly be fewer findings of implied private rights of action under
the Cort test because of the Court's reluctance to declare affirmative rights based upon congressional silence. Under the Touche Ross rationale, "implying a private right of action on the
basis of congressional silence is a hazardous enterprise, at best." 442 U.S. at 571. The upshot
of the Touche Ross decision is that the Court will use its discretion to find or deny an implied
right of action based on its own statutory interpretation. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82
(1975) ("it is not necessary to show an intention to create a private cause of action, although
an explicit purpose to deny such a cause of action would be controlling") (emphasis in
original). See also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-703 (1979).
68. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981) (no
implied private right of action found because of Title VII's and Equal Pay Act's comprehensive scope); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981) (Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899
was intended to benefit the public at large and thus no implied private right of action found
for any one class of persons); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981) (no
implied private right of action found under the Davis-Bacon Act because Congress had not
sought to protect the class of persons to which the employee belonged); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (because Congress expressly provided
remedies in other portions of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the omission of other
remedies was evidence that Congress never intended to confer implied private actions).
69. 451 U.S. 77 (1981).
70. Id. at 91-95. In Northwest Airlines, the petitioner airline brought suit to enforce its
right to contribution from respondent unions stemming from an Equal Pay Act and Title VII
class action suit that resulted in a judgment against the airline of over $20,000,000 in backpay,
damages, and interest. Id. at 81-82.
71. Id. at 95-99.
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tional rights or federal common law remedies. 7" In regard to preemption,
Justice Stevens remarked: "[once Congress addresses a subject, even a subject previously governed by federal common law, the justification for
lawmaking by the federal courts is greatly diminished. Thereafter, the task
of the federal courts is to interpret and apply statutory law, not to create

common law." 73 It appears that Northwest Airlines goes beyond a mere
refusal to create federal common law remedies. In fact, the case indicates
that in areas where federal common law has already been established, such as
interstate water pollution, congressional enactment of legislation would
automatically have it displaced.
THE MILWAUKEE II DECISION

Facts and ProceduralHistory
One month after the Milwaukee I decision, Illinois filed suit in the

Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to abate the
polluting of Lake Michigan allegedly caused by Milwaukee's discharge of
sewage.7" Milwaukee moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
enactment of the 1972 Amendments preempted Illinois' right to seek relief

under federal common law. The district court denied Milwaukee's motion
and held that the 1972 Amendments did not supplant, but rather sup-

plemented the federal common law remedy. 7' After five years of discovery

72. Id. at 97. In denying both an implied private right of action and a federal common law
remedy, Justice Stevens stated:
In almost any statutory scheme, there may be a need for judicial interpretation of
ambiguous or incomplete provisions. But the authority to construe a statute is fundamentally different from the authority to fashion a new rule or to provide a new
remedy which Congress has decided not to adopt. . . . The presumption that a
remedy was deliberately omitted from a statute is strongest when Congress has
enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme including an integrated system of procedures for enforcement. . . . The judiciary may not, in the face of such comprehensive legislative schemes, fashion new remedies that might upset carefully
considered legislative programs.
Id. (citations omitted). See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)
("[t]here is a basic difference between filling a gap left by Congress' silence and rewriting rules
that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted").
73. 451 U.S. 77, 95 n.34 (1981) (citing Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972)).
74. The entire complaint can be found in Joint Appendix, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois,
451 U.S. 304 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Joint App.]. The complaint set forth three counts.
Count I alleged that the viruses and bacteria flowing from Milwaukee's sewage discharge
would cause disease to Illinois citizens thereby violating the federal common law of nuisance.
Joint App., supra, at 24-29. Count II alleged that pathogens, or disease carrying organisms,
violated the Illinois Environmental Protection Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, §§ 1003(n),
1012(a) (1971). The Illinois statute made unlawful any alteration of the chemical or biological
waters of the State that would, or would likely, cause a nuisance or pose a threat to its
citizens. Joint App., supra, at 29-31. Count III alleged that the discharge of inadequately
treated sewage constituted a violation of the Illinois common law of nuisance. Id. at 31-32.
75. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 366 F. Supp. 298, 300 (ND. Ill. 1973). The district court
found that the 1972 Amendments "in no way intended to destroy any remedies available to the
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and months of trial, the district court entered a final judgment for Illinois
on all counts.76
The federal common law remedy granted by the district court set standards
that were stricter than those imposed by NPDES under the 1972 Amendments. The court ordered Milwaukee to construct enough storm sewers to
totally eliminate all wet-weather sewage overflows by the year 1986."7 Under
NPDES, Milwaukee was required to take only "corrective measures"
against wet-weather overflows.78 The second major requirement imposed
upon Milwaukee was the setting of effluent limitations that were more stringent than those established under NPDES.79
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed"0 the district
court's conclusion that the "obvious dangers" created by the discharges of

states." Id. The court also noted that where Congress had intended a given statute or remedy
to be preempted it made express provisions in the 1972 Amendments to do so. Id. at 300-01.
Milwaukee also filed motions to dismiss based upon lack of jurisdiction and venue but these
motions were denied. The court held that Milwaukee had established the requisite number of
minimum contacts with Illinois to bring it within the reach of the Illinois long-arm statute. The
venue question was summarily disposed of against Milwaukee. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 4
E.R.C. 1849 (N.D. Ill.
1972), reprinted in Petitioner's Appendices to the Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari at H-I, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) [reprinted material
hereinafter cited as App. to Pet. for Cert.].
76. 366 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ill.
1973). Although the district court judge remarked that the
case should be tried primarily under the federal common law of nuisance claim, he ruled on
state counts II and III because they fell under the pendent jurisdiction of the court. See App.
to Pet. for Cert., supra note 75, at F-2, F-24.
77. App. to Pet. for Cert., supra note 75, at D2-D3. Elimination of all wet-weather
overflows was to occur by July 1, 1986. The facility that was ordered to be built was required
to have the capacity to collect all wet-weather sewage overflows that might arise in a rainfall
equal to the largest rainfall on record over the previous 40 years. Id.
78. This requirement stemmed from a stipulation agreement reached in the settlement of a
state court action. Sewage Comm'n of Milwaukee v. Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Resources,
No. 152-342, slip op. (Dane Cir. Ct. March 25, 1977), reprintedin Joint App., supra note 74,
at 461-88. Milwaukee sought a declaratory judgment striking down the state code which
granted the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) the power to enforce its water treatment
compliance schedule. DNR counterclaimed that Milwaukee did not comply with the permits it
had issued. The parties eventually signed a stipulation agreement that required the elimination
of dry-weather overflows by July 1, 1982, but made no provision for the elimination of wetweather overflows. Joint App., supra note 74, at 461-71. In reference to wet-weather
overflows, the order stated that all "corrective work in each participating municipality is [to
be] completed by not [sic] later than July 1, 1986." Id. at 470 (emphasis added). Thus, the
judicial order mandating the elimination of all sewage overflows went beyond the statutory requirement which had mandated only corrective measures.
79. App. to Pet. for Cert., supra note 75, at D-5. The district court order imposed an effluent standard of 5 milligrams per liter (mg/I) of suspended solids (sewage particles in water)
and 5 milligrams per liter (mg/) of biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) (a measure of the
biodegradability of organic particles), while the permit administered by DNR only required
limitations of 30 mg/I suspended solids and 30 mg/I BOD. See Joint App., supra note 74, at
373, 407, 409, 411. Thus the standards set by the district court were at least six times more stringent than those permitted under the 1972 Amendments.
80. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979).
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untreated sewage necessitated the elimination of all wet-weather discharges."
The court concluded that when a real threat could not be avoided through
the normal channels of statutory enforcement procedures, dischargers of
pollutants could be held to a higher, federal common law standard."2 The
court, however, reversed the ruling on the effluent discharge limitations
because there was no evidence that more stringent effluent limitations
would reduce the real or potential health threat to Illinois citizens. 3
The Milwaukee II Rationale
The Supreme Court in Milwaukee IP4 reversed the lower court decision
and held that the enactment of the 1972 Amendments supplanted federal
common law. 5 Federal common law, the Court noted, exists in only a
limited number of areas, 86 and when Congress passes legislation that addresses an area previously covered by federal common law, the need for the
common law remedy ceases. 7 The Milwaukee II Court reemphasized that
federal common law would apply "[u]ntil the field has been made the subject of comprehensive legislation." 88
The Court viewed the 1972 Amendments as evidence of congressional intent to provide an "all-encompassing program" designed to clean up the
nation's waterways. ' Numerous congressmen, the Court observed, regarded
the 1972 Amendments as the most complete legislation ever devised to combat environmental problems.98 The Milwaukee II Court concluded that
because Congress had provided a comprehensive scheme of statutory

81. Id. at 170-73.
82. Id. at 165. See note 115 and accompanying text infra.
83. 599 F.2d at 173-77.
84.' City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
85. Id. at 317. It is important to note that the Court did not render a decision on either
state count I1 or Ill. See note 74 supra. The Milwaukee H Court pointed out that "although
respondent Illinois argues this point in its brief [that state law applies], the issue before us is
simply whether federal legislation has supplanted federal common law." 451 U.S. at 310 n.4.
86. 451 U.S. at 312-14. From the outset, the Milwaukee H Court made it clear that federal
courts were courts of limited rule-making authority and were not empowered to develop their
own rules of decision. The Court relied on Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963), for the
proposition that prior use of federal common law was the exception, not the rule.
87. 451 U.S. at 314.
88. Id. (quoting Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 241 (10th Cir. 1971)). The Court restated
its earlier Milwaukee I dictum: "It may happen that new federal laws and new federal regulations may in time pre-empt the field of federal common law nuisance." 451 U.S. at 310
(quoting Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972)).
89. 451 U.S. at 318.
90. Id. at 318 n.12. See 2 LEG. HIST. OF 1972, supra note 32, at 1269 (Sen. Randolph) ("It
is perhaps the most comprehensive legislation ... ever developed in this particular field of the
environment"); id. at 1408 (Sen. Hart) ("This is indeed a comprehensive bill and a giant forward step"); 1 LEG. HIsT. OF 1972, supra note 32, at 369 (Rep. Mizell) ("[Tihe most comprehensive and far-reaching water pollution bill . . . ever drafted"); id. at 343 (Rep. Young)
("[V]ery comprehensive and complex bill").
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remedies, federal courts cannot expand upon those remedies by supplementing them with federal common law."'
After applying the 1972 Amendments' enforcement provisions to
Milwaukee II's factual situation, the Court was convinced that Congress
had dealt comprehensively with the problems of effluent limitations and
sewage overflow discharges. Milwaukee had been granted discharge permits
by the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources pursuant to NPDES,
and effluent limitations were set at the prescribed amounts established by
the EPA.9" Because effluent limitations were thoroughly addressed by the
1972 Amendments, the Court concluded that federal courts are prohibited
from applying stricter federal common law standards for effluent limitations. 3
The Milwaukee II Court also regarded the statutory enforcement procedures controlling sewage overflows as equally comprehensive. Overflows
are "point sources" according to the 1972 Amendments,94 and therefore are
subject to the same permit issuance scheme as effluent limitations.
Milwaukee's discharge permits required "elimination or control of all
discharge overflow and/or bypass points" in its system.95 In order to ensure
compliance, the permits included extensive details regarding actual point
sources, reporting procedures, and monitoring programs.96 Based on these
facts, the Milwaukee II Court regarded the enforcement scheme developed
by Congress complete in every aspect and stated: "There is no 'interstice'
here to be filled by federal common law: overflows are covered by the Act
and have been addressed by the regulatory regime established by the Act." 97
The Court did not agree with Illinois' argument that sections 510 and
505(e) of the 1972 Amendments specifically preserve the federal common
law remedy. Although section 510 expressly authorizes the states to adopt
standards that are more stringent than statutory prescriptions, 9" the Court
91. 451 U.S. at 319.
92. State agencies, such as the DNR, promulgate effluent limitations according to the
EPA's guidelines, EPA Secondary Treatment Information, 40 C.F.R. § 133.102 (a), (b) (1980),
and the Court regarded the permits issued to Milwaukee to be in compliance with EPA standards. 451 U.S. at 319-20.
93. 451 U.S. at 320. The Milwaukee H Court stated: "Federal courts lack authority to impose more stringent effluent limitations under federal common law than those imposed by the
agency charged by Congress with administering this comprehensive scheme." Id.
94. See note 35 supra.
95. See Joint App., supra note 74, at 378-79, 416, 443.
96. Id. at 375, 412. The Court gave further evidence that statutory enforcement procedures
were more than adequate when it recognized the efficacy of the state court action which
resulted in a judgment order forcing Milwaukee to comply with its permits. 451 U.S. at 322.
See note 78 supra.
97. 451 U.S. at 323. The fact that Illinois was not satisfied with the permits established by
the state enforcement agency (DNR) did not, the Court noted, justify invoking federal common law. Id. at 324 n.18.
98. Section 510 provides, in pertinent part:
[N]othing in this Act shall (1)preclude or deny the right of any State . . .to adopt
or enforce (A) any standard or limitation respecting discharges of pollutants, or
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interpreted this section to mean that states are given the freedom to legislate
stricter standards only in regard to intrastate polluters.99 The Court reasoned
that because section 510 affects only intrastate conflicts, the argument advanced by Illinois was invalid as applied to interstate disputes.'

0

Section 505(e), the "savings clause", provides that "[n]othing in this section shall restrict any right which any person . . . may have under any
statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard . . . or
• ..any other relief .. ." , The Court ruled that the savings clause, like
section 510, did not preserve the federal common law remedy throughout
the 1972 Amendment because that provision only retained a federal common law remedy for actions brought under the citizen suit section. 0 2
Because the savings clause in the citizen suit section is the only provision in
the 1972 Amendments that expressly retains the remedy, the Court reasoned
that there was a presumption against preserving federal common law in all
other sections. Furthermore, the Court declared that even if the savings
clause could be interpreted to apply throughout the 1972 Amendments, congressional reference to "common-law" more than likely was intended to encompass state, rather than federal, common law.' 3 In arriving at the
Milwaukee II decision, the Supreme Court gave Milwaukee its first victory
in the ten-year long legal battle, and remanded the case for further adjudication. 0'

(B) any requirement respecting control or abatement of pollution; except that...
such [a) State . . .may not adopt or enforce any effluent limitation ... which is
less stringent than the effluent limitation . . . under this Act....
33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1976).

99. 451 U.S. at 327-28.
100. Id. at 328.
101. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1976).
102. 451 U.S. at 328-29. The Court highlighted the fact that the savings clause was contained
within the subdivision entitled "Citizen Suits".
103. Id. The Court did not enunciate its reasons for finding that state common law was controlling. This may have stemmed from the fact that the legislative activity for the 1972 Amendments occurred prior to Milwaukee I and that the prevailing standard was state common law.
See Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971) (discussed in note 118 infra). See
also Brief for Petitioners at 28 n.9, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Pet.].
104. 451 U.S. at 332. Justice Blackmun's strong dissent criticized the majority's systematic
displacement of federal common law.' Justice Blackmun recognized the unique role federal
common law played in complementing statutory policies and objectives, especially in the area
of pollution control. Justice Blackmun argued that precluding Illinois from a federal common
law remedy might be justified under circumstances where there was no actual injury and only
the threat of harm prevailed. The Justice disagreed, however, with the majority's conclusion
that federal courts "lacked authority" to impose stricter pollution standards-that authority
was established by Milwaukee I. 451 U.S. at 350 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun
further criticized the majority for failing to properly interpret the 1972 Amendment's savings
clause and its legislative history. The majority's interpretation, Justice Blackmun commented,
was "extremely strained" and did not further congressional intent. Id. at 341-42 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
On remand to the Seventh Circuit, Illinois argued, in an unpublished statement, that Con-
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ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

Milwaukee I's restrictive holding raises questions about the accuracy of
the Court's statutory construction and analysis of legislative history. Closer
scrutiny of the statute and congressional reports does not support the conclusion that Congress intended to preempt federal common law. Furthermore, the Court's sweeping language suggests that, even in instances when
Congress fails to address unforeseeable forms of pollution, federal courts
will still be precluded from performing necessary interstitial functions to
give effect to the pollution statute. Such a result seriously undermines the
role of the judiciary to fulfill the spirit of the law.
Statutory Construction
The Milwaukee II Court took an extremely narrow view of the savings
clause"' by holding that it applies only to citizen suits. It is a well-settled
rule of statutory construction that the plain meaning of a statute's words
should be followed unless literal construction would lead to an absurd
result.' °6 The majority's interpretation of the savings clause violates the
plain meaning rule because that section preserves supplemental remedies to
persons other than individual citizens. The savings clause expressly declares
that common law rights are preserved for those persons who bring suit.' 7 A
"person", according to the 1972 Amendments, is defined as "an individual
• . .State ...or political subdivision of a State ... ,"'I' Based upon the
express inclusion of "State" within the definition of a "person", it is
unlikely that the intent of the savings clause was to preserve federal common law remedies exclusively in citizen suits. Thus, under the plain meaning
rule, the savings clause would seem to retain this remedy for actions
brought by states.
The Court's denial of a federal common law remedy also contradicts the
gress expressly sought to retain state law remedies under the 1972 Amendments, and therefore,
the appellate court should affirm state counts II and III. Statement of Plaintiff-Appellee, Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, No. 77-2246, (7th Cir. June 18, 1981). The thrust of Milwaukee's
argument on remand was that federal law should be the controlling law because of the interstate nature of the dispute. Milwaukee argued that the only available remedy was federal
statutory law, and consequently, because Illinois claimed a federal common law violation
rather than a violation of the 1972 Amendments, the case should be remanded for dismissal.
Statement of the Defendants-Appellants, Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, No. 77-2246, (7th Cir.
July, 1981).
105. See text accompanying note 101 supra.
106. The plain meaning rule was first expressed in Holy Trinity Church v. United States,
143 U.S. 457, 460 (1892), in which the Court stated: "[If] a literal construction of the words of
a statute be absurd, the act must be so construed as to avoid the absurdity." Years later, in
United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534 (1940), Justice Reed noted that
"[there is . . . no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by
which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes. . . . In such cases we have
followed their plain meaning." Id. at 54.
107. See text accompanying note 101 supra.
108. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (1976).
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principle that statutes are to be construed as non-preemptive of common
law remedies unless Congress unequivocally mandates otherwise. The
Supreme Court has previously stated that "[s]tatutes which invade the common law . . . are to be read with a presumption favoring . . . retention.''" 9
In the present case, the federal common law of nuisance in interstate pollution disputes was unanimously established in Milwaukee I. Accordingly, a
presumption exists in favor of preserving federal common law. Arguably,
Congress could shift this presumption through express legislative mandate.
The majority opinion, however, does not cite to any of the 1972 Amendments' provisions that suggest that this presumption of federal common law
was to be overridden.'" In fact, Congress expressly set forth the remedies it
wanted preempted,'' and those remedies did not include federal common
law. Contrary to established common law and statutory principles, the
Milwaukee II Court concluded that there was a presumption against preserving federal common law.
The statute's legislative history provides further support for the preservation of federal common law. In enacting the 1972 Amendments, Congress
attempted to vest the power to set pollution standards in the federal government. Careful examination of the 1972 Amendments indicates that Congress
did not want these standards developed solely through common law." 2 According to a senate report, the standards used in citizen suits were to be
similar to those employed in administrative proceedings. ' 3 Congress
recognized, however, that these standards might not be stringent enough to
curtail pollution under all circumstances and that a common law remedy

109. lsbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952). See Edmonds v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 263 (1979) (Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act Amendments of 1972 did not disrupt established principles of federal
maritime law).
In reference to federal statutory preemption of state law, the Supreme Court has stated: "If
Congress is authorized to act in a field, it should manifest its intention clearly. It will not be
presumed that a federal statute was intended to supersede the exercise of the power of the state
unless there is a clear manifestation of intention to do so." Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199,
202-03 (1952). See New York State Dept. of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973)
(quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952)). See generally Hirsch, Toward a New View

of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515; Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting
Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975).
110. Although there was no reference to federal common law in the statute's legislative
history, Congress did remark on limiting common law relief under certain circumstances. See
notes 112-16 and accompanying text infra.
Ill. E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342(5) (1976) (preemption of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899);
id. § 1322(f)(1) (preemption of State statutes and regulations in the design, manufacture or installation of marine sanitation devices).
112. Congress stated in the senate report that "Section 505 would not substitute a 'common
law' or court-developed definition of water quality. An alleged violation of an effluent control
limitation or standard, would not require reanalysis of technological [sic] in other considerations at the enforcement stage." 2 LEG. HIST. OF 1972, supra note 32, at 1497.
113. Id. at 1498-99. The senate report stated:
The standards for which enforcement would be sought either under ad-
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might be appropriate. Congress expressed the view that "if damages could
be shown, other remedies would remain available. Compliance with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common law action
for pollution damages."" 4 Although compliance would normally constitute
a valid defense, Congress realized that in cases where damages could be
shown, a common law remedy would still exist.'" Based on this notion, it is
reasonable to conclude that federal common law was not to be displaced by
the 1972 Amendments, but rather it was to provide the necessary function
of imposing stricter requirements in instances where remedies under the
statute were found to be inadequate. ' 6
ministrative enforcement or through citizen enforcement procedures are the same.
Therefore the participation of citizens in the courts seeking enforcement of water
pollution control requirements should not result in inconsistent policy.
Authority granted to citizens to bring enforcement actions under this section is
limited to effluent standards or limitations established administratively under the
Act.
Id. The savings clause was also interpreted by the House of Representatives to mean that it
"provides that the right of persons . . . to seek enforcement or other relief under any statute
or common law is not affected." H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 134 (1972),
reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. OF 1972, supra note 32, at 821.
114. 2 LEG. HIST. OF 1972, supra note 32, at 1499 (emphasis added). Milwaukee argued that
under 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (1976), compliance with a permit was deemed compliance under
§ 505. Under Milwaukee's reasoning, a federal common law remedy was ultimately conditioned
by the statutory limitation standards. See Brief for Pet., supra note 103, at 55-56. This analysis
was only partially correct because it failed to take into account the fact that Congress provided
for common law remedies to enforce stricter standards upon a showing of damages even when
a discharger was in compliance with a permit.
115. The dissenting opinion in Milwaukee II agreed with the Seventh Circuit in its conclusion that stricter pollution standards were required. Justice Blackmun commented that congressional legislation did not mark the outer boundary of standards that could be applied. 451
U.S. at 348 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The Seventh Circuit recognized that there may be instances when sanctioned permit standards will not give an aggrieved party adequate protection:
[I]f
the evidence . . . shows that requirements more stringent than those imposed in
the NPDES permits are necessary to protect Illinois residents . . . plaintiffs are entitled to have the more stringent requirements imposed. We can think of no other
reason for Congress' preserving previously existing rights and remedies than to
protect the interests of those who would be able to show that the requirements imposed pursuant to the federal statute are inadequate to protect their interests.
When the complaining party is a neighboring state, the federal common law of
nuisance provides a peculiarly appropriate remedy.
599 F.2d at 165.
116. This analysis was not employed by either Illinois or Milwaukee. Milwaukee argued for
a strict holding that federal common law was preempted under all circumstances, while the
suggested alternative analysis would allow for the application of federal common law upon a
showing of damages. Illinois, on the other hand, most likely failed to proffer this interpretation because there was little, if any, evidence of actual damage. Counsel for Milwaukee
remarked that a "fundamental, basic and controlling fact of this case is that no witness and no
exhibit in the entire record found any virus or other pathogen from any source in any Illinois
or Michigan waters." Brief for Pet., supra note 103, at 69. Note also that the Illinois complaint sought injunctive relief exclusively and did not claim any damages. See note 74 supra.
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The majority's conclusion that Congress preserved state common law".7
instead of federal common law is difficult to justify, especially given the
fact that Milwaukee I, which endorsed federal common law, was decided
before the 1972 Amendments were passed.'' 8 It is more likely that Congress, realizing that federal common law could remain an effective tool for
controlling pollution, intended to preserve this remedy in order to further
carry out the statute's policies and objectives. The Milwaukee H Court was
somewhat precipitous in assuming that the common law referred to in the
statute was exclusively state common law.''
The Necessity of Federal Common Law
By preempting federal common law, the Milwaukee II Court stripped the
federal courts of a primary function. Without the ability to fashion federal
common law interstitially, federal courts may become ineffective in shaping
adequate remedies for aggrieved parties. It is questionable why the Court
proceeded to use overreaching language to preclude federal common law in
all cases of water pollution.
The Court relied upon legislators' remarks that the legislation was "comprehensive" and "far-reaching" in drawing the conclusion that federal

117. The Court cited Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v.
Train, 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976), as support for its conclusion that common law referred
to state common law. 451 U.S. at 329. The court in Jones noted that "Congress recognized the
continuing validity of state common law nuisance actions in subsection 1365 (e) of the Amendments." 539 F2d at 1009 n.9. The Jones court distinguished Milwaukee I, however, in that the
Jones controversy was strictly "local", and thus lacked the federal, interstate interests enunciated in Milwaukee I. "Where the controversy is strictly local . . . and where there is no
allegation of interstate effect, we conclude there is no body of federal common law to which
" Id. at 1010.
plaintiffs may resort ..
118. Milwaukee argued that Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971), was
controlling at the time Congress had substantially completed the drafting of the bill. Wyandotte mandated that it was state, not federal, common law that was applicable. See Brief for
Pet., supra note 103, at 28 n.9. It should be noted, however, that prior to the enactment of the
1972 Amendments, Congress did review other major judicial decisions that impacted the bill.
Thus, Congress had the opportunity to address the Milwaukee I decision, yet there was no
mention in the legislative history of any negative effects stemming from Milwaukee I. See I
LEG. HIST. OF 1972, supra note 32, at 179. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae, New England
Legal Foundation at 17-18 n.12, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
There is additional evidence that Congress intended to preserve federal common law. For example, even though Congress was well aware of the Illinois v. City of Milwaukee district court
decision during the debates which, preceded the adoption of the Clean Water Act of 1977, it
did not attempt to disturb that ruling or its application. See Brief of Respondent at 42-45, City
of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
119. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun set forth legislative history that supported the conclusion that Congress was fully aware of federal common law during the passage of the 1972
Amendments. 451 U.S. at 343-44 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Seventh Circuit also refuted
the state common law argument. "There is nothing in the phrase 'any statute or common law'
that suggests that this provision is limited to state common law. There is no reason to believe
that Congress would have wished to preserve state common law claims and preclude federal
common law claims." 599 F.2d at 163.
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common law was preempted.' ° These descriptive terms are problematic
because even though a statute may be enacted with the intent that it will encompass all possible violations, it will inevitably be incomplete. Congress
cannot possibly anticipate every conceivable factual pattern that could arise
under a particular piece of legislation.' 2 ' There will always be gaps in
legislation that will eventually result in inadequate remedies for aggrieved
parties.
Illustrative of this problem is the recent decision of Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill'22 (TVA) in which the Court was confronted with enforcing the Endangered Species Act. The Court noted that although the Endangered Species Acts of 1966 and 1969 23' had been previously considered
replete in every aspect,' 4 Congress was forced to amend the statute due to
its latent ineffectiveness. The TVA Court commented that "[despite the
fact that the 1966 and 1969 legislation represented 'the most comprehensive
of its type to be enacted . . .' ", Congress had to amend it further if its
goals were to be realized.' 25 Thus, Congress saw a continuing need to "relegislate" those portions of the Endangered Species Act that obviously lacked
the comprehensiveness Congress originally had intended.
TVA exemplifies the proposition that every statute is enacted with inherent, inescapable deficiencies. The 1972 Amendments are no exception.
Regardless of the import that the Milwaukee II opinion placed on the views
of the numerous Congressmen who commented on the "comprehensiveness"
of the 1972 Amendments, subsequent revisions clearly indicate that Congress did not consider it to be complete. For instance, the Clean Water Act
of 1977 made revisions and improvements to nearly every section of the
1972 Amendments.' 26 Thus, the argument made by the Milwaukee II Court
120. See note 89 and accompanying text supra. The Court, in New York Dept. of Social
Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973), ruled that preemption of federal law over state law
should not depend on the "comprehensiveness" of a particular statute. The Dublino Court rejected "the contention that pre-emption is to be inferred merely from the comprehensive
character of the federal [statute]." Id. at 415.
121. As one commentator noted:
Although Congress has in rare instances delegated to the judiciary the authority to
create a comprehensive body of decisional law in a particular area, the role of the
courts is ordinarily interpretive and implemental. The exercise of this judicial competence is premised on the inevitable incompleteness of legislation. . . . In these
cases it is the task of the judiciary to fill in the legislative lacunae in the manner
most compatible with the statutory framework.

Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision, 77 HARV. L. REV.
1084, 1089-90 (1964). See Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L.

REV. 489, 498 (1954) (legislation is rarely ever complete).
122. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
123. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976).
124. 437 U.S. at 174-75.
125. Id. at 176 (emphasis added). Note that the Endangered Species Act of 1973 did not
profess any "newly declared national policy" per se, but rather only enforcement procedures
were being strengthened. Id. at 174-75.
126. The Clean Water Act of 1977 amended over thirty-five sections with substantial
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that the "comprehensiveness"
of the 1972 Amendments justified the
ousting of federal common law is undermined by the fact that Congress
substantially rewrote the legislation only five years later.
Because of the inherent deficiencies in legislation, the primary function of
federal common law has been to provide statutes with the necessary interstice to effectuate statutory goals and objectives.' 27 The Supreme Court
once stated that "[tihe inevitable incompleteness presented by all legislation
means that interstitial federal lawmaking is a basic responsibility of the
federal courts."' 28 It may well be that enforcement mechanisms in place today will be ill-equipped to deal with the nation's future pollution problems.
Thus, the federal common law is necessary to remedy environmental problems that Congress was unable to foresee. In short, the power of the federal
courts to fashion remedies not expressly prescribed within the 1972 Amendments, but contained within its main objectives, is crucial in giving effect to
congressional goals and in strengthening the underpinnings of the statute.'2 9
IMPLICATIONS OF MIL WA UKEE II

The danger of the Milwaukee II decision lies not only in the fact that
federal common law has been preempted by the 1972 Amendments, but also
that in the future the Court may draw perfunctory conclusions as to the
preemptive effect of other "comprehensive" environmental laws. 3" Based
on a recent case, the abrogation of federal common law in all forms of environmental legislation appears almost inevitable.
The Milwaukee H rationale has already been applied to another enrewrites in many of those sections. See 3 LEG. HIST. OF 1977, supra note 45, at 55-179. See
notes 45-48 and accompanying text supra.
127. Professor Miskin, in his oft-quoted work on federal law stated that "[alt the very least,
effective Constitutionalism requires recognition of power in the federal courts to declare, as a
matter of common law or 'judicial legislation', rules which may be necessary to fill in interstitially or otherwise effectuate the statutory patterns enacted . . . by Congress." Miskin,
The Variousness of "Federal Law". Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and
State Rules For Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 800 (1957).
128. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973).
129. Justice Jackson eloquently summed up the benefits of federal common law: "Were we
bereft of the common law, our federal system would be impotent. This follows from the
recognized futility of attempting all-complete statutory codes, and is apparent from the terms
of the Constitution itself." D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S.
447, 470 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).
130. Other environmental statutes that the Supreme Court noted as having the same citizen
provision sections as the 1972 Amendments were: the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-2629 (1976); the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C.
§§ 1201-1328 (Supp. 111 1979); the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972,
33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444 (1976); the Deep Water Port Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524
(1976); the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300(f)-(j)(9) (1976); the Noise Control Act
of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 (1976); the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987
(1976); the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. II1 1979). There was nothing in the majority's opinion to suggest that the Court would construe the citizen suits in the above environmental statutes any differently than the Milwaukee II decision. See 451 U.S. at 328 n.21.
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vironmental statute. In Middlesex County Sewerage v. National Sea Clammers Association,' a decision handed down less than two months after
Milwaukee II, the Supreme Court ruled that federal common law had been
preempted' 32 by the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of
1972 (MPRSA).' 3 3 The National Sea Clammers Court gave little supporting

evidence for its conclusion that Congress intended federal common law to
be preempted. The Court merely noted that the MPRSA's citizen suit provi-

sion had its counterpart in the 1972 Amendments.' 34 Conspicuously missing
from the National Sea Clammers Court's reasoning was an analysis of the
differences between the MPRSA and the 1972 Amendments. 33 For example,
the MPRSA does not utilize the extensive NPDES program or its effluent
standards,' 3 6 the very aspects of the 1972 Amendments which prompted the
Milwaukee II Court to conclude that the legislation was comprehensive.' 3'
Nonetheless, the Court concluded that MPRSA was as comprehensive in

addressing the problems of ocean dumping as the 1972 Amendments were
in regulating pollution of navigable waterways.' 38
The implications of the National Sea Clammers decision are most severe
when one analyzes the process used by the Court in reaching its conclusion
of preemption. The National Sea Clammers Court did not use the kind of
in-depth analysis given to the 1972 Amendments in Milwaukee I. Instead,

131. 453 U.S. 1 (1981). Plaintiffs were fishermen who brought an action against officials
from the states of New York and New Jersey to enjoin the dumping of sewage into the ocean.
Plaintiffs alleged that defendants' actions were causing the "collapse" of the fishing industries
in the greater New York metropolitan area. Id. at 4-5.
132. Id. at 22.
133. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444 (1976). MPRSA's policy is to "regulate the dumping of all
types of materials into ocean waters and to prevent or strictly limit the dumping into ocean
waters of any material which would adversely affect human health ....
Id. § 1401(b). The
savings clause in the MPRSA is somewhat analogous to that in the 1972 Amendments because
it provides a common law remedy to seek enforcement of the statute's standards. The savings
clause provides, in pertinent part, that "the injunctive relief provided by this subsection shall
not restrict any right which any person . . . may have under any statute or common law to
seek enforcement of any standard or limitation or to seek any other relief." Id. § 1415(g)(5).
The Court also ruled on the availability of an implied private right of action for the plaintiff. Because the association failed to comply with statutory notice provisions it was precluded
from seeking statutory relief. Instead, the association sought, but was denied, an implied
private right of action under both the savings clause of the 1972 Amendments the analogous
MPRSA section. 453 U.S. at 13-15, 17-18.
134. 453 U.S. at 14.
135. Although the National Sea Clammers Court listed the pertinent portions of each
statute, it failed to provide any comparative analysis. Id. at 6 nn.9-11.
136. The MPRSA does have a permit program. However, it is vastly different from the 1972
Amendments in that it vests the permit granting power in the Secretary of the Army and
employs little, if any, of the EPA enforcement mechanisms. See 33 U.S.C. § 1412 (1976).
137. See notes 92 & 93 and accompanying text supra.
138. 453 U.S. at 22. It is difficult to compare the MPRSA's comprehensiveness to that of
the 1972 Amendments. There are over 60 sections within the 1972 Amendments comprising
more than 125 pages of standards and sanctions while the MPRSA contains 17 sections comprising only 16 pages.
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the National Sea Clammers Court evinced a strong desire to infer preemption. The only apparent justification for the inference was a perfunctory
reliance on the Milwaukee II decision.
The Court's summary treatment of the MPRSA in National Sea Clammers characterizes its unwillingness to extend the application of federal
common law under other environmental statutes. If such a policy is carried
through to all environmental statutes, it is conceivable that federal common
law of nuisance will be totally eradicated.' 39
There is another significant ramification of the Milwaukee H decision-one that goes directly to the heart of federalism. Congress, in
witnessing the degradation of the nation's environmental resources, found it
necessary to strike a balance in favor of federal regulation rather than to
allow the states and their varying laws to control. The 1972 Amendments,
for example, stress a uniform national approach toward solving environmental problems. By enacting the 1972 Amendments, Congress mandated that federal law was to govern disputes arising out of pollution of interstate and navigable waters.
The Milwaukee II decision abrogating federal common law will disrupt
the balance established by Congress because it shifts judicial power away
from federal courts. Since federal common law is no longer available, many
states will be unable to obtain adequate remedies in federal court. This
could potentially force many parties into state courts to seek relief under
state law. As more actions are brought in state courts, the number of varying standards applied will likely increase to a point where there will no
longer be a uniform set of pollution laws, and the uniform federal statutory
scheme established by Congress will be defeated.' °
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Milwaukee II ruled that in the area of water pollution, federal common law has been preempted by congressional enactment
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. The
Court reasoned that once Congress addressed the problem of water pollution through a comprehensive statutory scheme, federal courts were
precluded from imposing stricter federal common law standards.
139. In calling for the total abolition of all federal common law nuisance remedies, the Illinois Chamber of Commerce, as amici curiae, maintained that any encroachment upon congressional regulatory programs would be an "unconstitutional usurpation of legislative
power." The Chamber of Commerce not only argued for the preemption of federal common
law in the area of water pollution, but also in the areas of air pollution, control of toxic
substances, insecticides, and hazardous wastes. See Brief of the Illinois State Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners, Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S.
304 (1981).
140. Justice Blackmun found Milwaukee H's "de-control" of the power of the federal
courts to be one of the more "disturbing" aspects of the decision. The dissent feared that
there would no longer be a uniform approach toward solving interstate pollution disputes. 451
U.S. at 353 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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The majority's reasoning can be attacked on the grounds that proper
statutory construction and legislative history strongly support a contrary
conclusion. Under the statute's savings clause, Congress expressly sought to
preserve the federal common law remedy. Furthermore, the Court's conclusion that a presumption exists against retaining common law remedies is
misplaced. Long established principles mandate a finding of preemption only
in instances when it is expressly and unequivocally stated by Congress.
There is no affirmative language to be found in the 1972 Amendments or in
the legislative history that would support a conclusion of preemption.
On a broader scale, the fundamental principles underlying federalism are
also affected because Milwaukee II disrupts the careful balance of federal
control Congress sought when it enacted the statute. With federal common
law unavailable to federal courts, many aggrieved parties will be unable to
get adequate relief under federal law. This will result in future plaintiffs
favoring state courts for adjudication of their disputes. A shift in judicial
power away from federal courts is precisely the antithesis of what Congress
was trying to achieve when it enacted the 1972 Amendments.
When Congress enacts federal legislation which establishes national
priorities, it is incumbent upon the judicial branch to ensure that congressional objectives are carried out. The ability of federal courts to fashion
federal common law in the area of environmental pollution is paramount in
meeting this end. The Supreme Court's restrictive holding in Milwaukee II
severely damages this once cooperative relationship in the area of pollution
control. Milwaukee II strips away the very mechanisms that enabled federal
courts to give full effect to federal pollution control legislation.
Dennis J. Gallitano

